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ABSTRACT
Welfare states contribute to people’s well-being in many different ways.
Bringing all these contributions under a common metric is tricky. Here
we propose doing so through the notion of temporal autonomy: the freedom
to spend one’s time as one pleases, outside the necessities of everyday life.
Using income and time use surveys from five countries (the USA,
Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden) that represent the principal
types of welfare and gender regimes, we propose ways of operationalising
the time that is strictly necessary for people to spend in paid labour,
unpaid household labour, and personal care. The time people have at
their disposal after taking into account what is strictly necessary in these
three arenas – which we christen discretionary time – represents people’s
temporal autonomy. We measure the impact on this of government taxes,
transfers, and childcare subsidies in these five countries. In so doing, we
calibrate the contributions of the different welfare and gender regimes
that exist in these countries, in ways that correspond to the lived reality
of people’s daily lives.
Introduction
In assessing the varying impacts of different countries’ welfare states, it
would be frightfully handy if actually we had some direct measure of
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people’s welfare. Alas, we do not. All we have are more or less indirect
objective and subjective indicators. Income, familiarly, is one. Time, we
suggest, could be another.
Welfare state researchers commonly use people’s income as a proxy for
welfare. They do so knowing it is not a perfect proxy (Ringen ).
Income is, at most, a measure of potential welfare – a measure of
command over resources. For purposes of public policy, a millionaire is
counted as rich by virtue of her command over resources, regardless of
her actual consumption.
Many of the same things that are said to justify treating income as a
proxy for welfare could equally well be said for treating time as a proxy
for welfare. Time and money are conjoined in the production function
for welfare, just as labour and capital are conjoined in the production
function for commodities. It takes money to buy goods, but it takes time
to consume them. Time is an important resource – arguably, the
‘ ultimate scarce resource’ (Zeckhauser ) – required for producing
welfare. Having more command over time increases your potential
welfare: being richer in time terms increases your potential welfare in
ways strictly analogous to the ways in which being richer in money terms
does. Of course, as with income so too with time: whether one is counted
as rich or poor, in terms of time just as in terms of money, ought (for
public-policy purposes, anyway) to depend on one’s command over
resources, not on one’s consumption of resources.
Here we operationalise the notion of command over time through a
notion of discretionary time, constructed on the basis of income and time
use surveys. This is related to, but importantly different from, the
conventional time use category of spare time. The latter is a function of
how much time people actually spend in paid labour, unpaid household
labour, and personal care; spare time is in that respect more akin to a
measure of one’s consumption of the resource of time. Discretionary time
is a function of how much time people strictly need to spend in those
activities. Measuring as it does the extent to which their allocation of time
is not dictated by strict necessity, discretionary time is an indicator of
people’s control over the resource of time.
We will elaborate those concepts and describe their operationalisation
in subsequent sections of this paper. Then we turn to data from five
countries – the USA, Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden – to
illustrate their usefulness as measures of the varying impact of welfare
regimes of very different sorts. Sweden is often regarded as the classically
social-democratic welfare state (albeit under a rare period of conservative
rule during the time period covered by our data); the USA and Australia
are typically regarded as classically liberal welfare states; and Germany
and France are typically seen as classically corporatist welfare states.
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Furthermore, each welfare regime is associated with a distinct gender and
family regime, as elaborated in the following section. The tax-transfer
and childcare policies derived from the various regime imperatives are
shown in subsequent sections to impact strongly and differentially on the
amount of discretionary time – on people’s control over the resource of
time – in each of those countries.
Regime imperatives: welfare, gender, family
Welfare state researchers typically talk of the ‘ three worlds of welfare
capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen ; cf. Titmuss ; Castles ;
Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven ; Goodin and Mitchell ,
vol. ). Of course there are important variants within each of the three
major clusters, there are important cases that do not fit within any of
them, and no country fits any of the ideal types perfectly (Castles and
Mitchell ). Still, the basic features of the main three worlds are
familiar points for orienting comparative welfare state studies. And while
the corresponding gender and family regimes overlap those welfare
regimes only imperfectly, there are some general patterns that do
nonetheless stand out (Lewis ; Gauthier ; Gornick, Meyers and
Ross ; Sainsbury ; Esping-Andersen , ch. ; O’Connor,
Orloff and Shaver ; Korpi ; Gornick and Meyers ). The
time use patterns found within countries are likely to reflect, at least in
part, the prevailing welfare, gender, and family regimes (Gershuny ).
The liberal regime, exemplified by the USA and Australia, is a
residualist welfare regime. The main mechanism for promoting people’s
welfare in a liberal regime is the capitalist, market economy. The liberal
state is classically relegated to safeguarding the conditions of free
exchange and fair competition and correcting market failures. Poor relief
in a liberal regime is a matter of charity, initially a religious duty that has
now been assumed by the state. Categorical welfare benefits, sometimes
of a moderately generous sort, go to the ‘ deserving poor’ (such as the old,
the young, and the disabled) who are excused from paid labour as a
matter of public policy. Otherwise, however, liberal welfare benefits are
targeted tightly on the poor and they are paid at a rate only barely
adequate to alleviate the worst of their distress, for fear of creating
disincentives against participation in paid labour.
The liberal approach to gender relations and the family is dominated
by the stark individualism that rests at its core. Liberal regimes might
intervene with anti-discrimination legislation, but they do so purely to
prevent anti-competitive practices in the paid labour market, in ways that
are assiduously gender-blind. And while the poverty of lone mothers
might be addressed as a matter of poor relief, liberals basically regard the
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family as falling decisively on the private side of the public-private
dichotomy, unfit as the subject for any substantial public intervention.
The corporatist regime, exemplified by Germany, France, and other
countries of Continental Europe is a conservative welfare regime (van
Kersbergen ). Society is seen as a cooperative venture, with various
groups (labour and capital, men and women, etc.) each having their
distinctive role to play. The task of corporatist public policy is to
underwrite social cohesion and social stability. Welfare benefits are
typically earnings-related and hence status-preserving. Fiscally, corpora-
tist regimes tend to engage in a substantial amount of churning, giving
back to people in benefits roughly what they take from them in taxes.
The family, and traditional gender roles within it, have historically
been lynchpins of corporatist social thinking. The male’s role in a
classically corporatist society is that of breadwinner for the family as a
whole; the female’s role is that of homemaker. Marriage and child-
bearing are strongly encouraged. Lone motherhood, in particular, is
strongly discouraged.
The social democratic regime, exemplified by Sweden and other
countries in Scandinavia, is a highly egalitarian welfare regime. Charac-
terised by class politics and socialist economics, social democratic regimes
strive toward social equality in a multitude of ways (Korpi ). One is
through macroeconomic management, promoting high levels of employ-
ment and earnings. Another is through redistributive taxes and generous
welfare benefits, typically of a universal kind.
The egalitarianism of social democrats extends to their approach to
gender relations and the family. They strive to bring women into the paid
labour force fully on a par with men, with public employment being one
major mechanism used to this end. Partly in furtherance of women’s
participation in the paid labour market, social democrats typically
provide a generous system of public care for children under school age.
More generally, social democratic family policy is strongly oriented
toward the interests of ‘ the next generation’, and provides myriad forms
of support to children and their carers out of a combination of egalitarian
and pro-natalist concerns.
Some features are commonly present across all three of these welfare
and gender regimes. Each, for its different reasons, shares a concern for
the welfare of those who are especially disadvantaged, and strives to
provide some kind of social safety net as a result. This is seen by liberals
as a matter of poor relief, by corporatists as a way of manifesting and
promoting social cohesion, and by social democrats as an expression and
instrument of social equality. Whichever the rationale, redistributing
toward the bottom (to a greater or lesser extent) is a common feature
across all three regimes.
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So too is a concern with freedom and autonomy, although once again
the meanings of those terms vary. The freedom liberals promote is the
negative liberty of free markets: freedom from purposive intervention by
particular others in one’s affairs. What liberals see as ‘ freedom to choose’
(Friedman and Friedman ) socialists deride as ‘ freedom to lose’
(Roemer ). What social democrats promote is not ‘ freedom from’
but rather ‘ freedom to’, by providing people with the resources that
would allow them to actually implement their preferred choices.
Corporatists see freedom in more Hegelian terms, in which people are
freed to realise their true nature as fundamentally social beings living in
organic groups (first and foremost, the family).
Measuring welfare
The provision of welfare is a complex process involving a range of
institutions, including the state, the market, and the family (Peattie and
Rein ; Rose a, b). Welfare itself is a vague term, meaning
different things to different people over the years. It has, correspondingly,
been examined through a wide variety of measures. These include
objective measures of various types, as well as various subjective
measures, such as happiness as measured in the now-conventional way by
responses to surveys asking people, ‘ All things considered, how is your
life going these days?’ (Frey and Stutzer a, b; Layard ). This
paper will focus on objective measures of welfare, the impact of
discretionary time on happiness is explored in a companion paper
(Eriksson, Rice and Goodin ).
Measures of welfare – of the objective type – are most commonly
based on income: per capita GDP, for example, or post-government
transfer household income adjusted by equivalence scales to take into
account economies of scale in consumption and the differing needs of
households of different sizes.
Welfare, however, derives not only from money but also from time. A
measure of welfare would ideally incorporate information on both. The
construction of more inclusive measures of this kind has of course been
attempted. Most prominent among these efforts has been the construc-
tion of measures of full income, which assign monetary values to
non-monetary items – such as leisure time and time spent in unpaid
household labour – and then add the assigned monetary values of these
items to an income measure to yield full income (Nordhaus and Tobin
a, b; Singer, Bernolak, Usher, Denison and Meyer ;
Beckerman ; Travers and Richardson ; OECD ; Holloway,
Short and Tamplin ; Abraham and Mackie ). Combining
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information on both income and time use in these ways yields assess-
ments of welfare that are more inclusive than those based on income
alone.
Temporal dimensions of welfare are sometimes investigated through
studies of the incidence and distribution of spare time and leisure. At the
theoretical level, spare time and leisure are usually conceptualised as
those activities for which the direct pleasures of performing the activity
are greater than the indirect pleasures subsequently made possible by the
changes performing the activity brings about in the state of the world
(Hawrylyshyn ; Juster, Courant and Dow ).
At the empirical level, spare time and leisure are usually operational-
ised in a far cruder manner. Spare time, in hours per week, is typically
defined as: spare time =  – actual paid labour time – actual unpaid
household labour time – actual personal care time. This approach
presupposes that paid labour, unpaid household labour, and personal
care are activities in which the direct pleasures are always less than the
indirect pleasures, and it classifies time spent in those activities accord-
ingly (specifically, as not being time which is spare for leisure). That is
probably by and large true, but it is not invariably so. Paid labour is
sometimes enjoyable, sometimes so much so that it yields more direct
pleasure than indirect pleasure. The same is true of time spent in unpaid
household labour and personal care. In those cases paid labour, unpaid
household labour, and personal care should be treated as instances of
spare time or leisure. Ideally, a measure of spare time would be able to
distinguish two components within actual time in paid labour, unpaid
household labour, and personal care – one component that is an instance
of spare time or leisure, and another component that is not.
In this paper we suggest a different measure, which we believe
measures something important in its own right (temporal autonomy) and
which we also believe is a superior indicator of welfare. Ours is a measure
that incorporates information on income and information on time use,
but which (unlike full income measures) operates on a temporal rather
than a monetary metric. Temporal metrics have the advantage of being
more readily comparable across time and space than their monetary
counterparts: no one has more than  hours a day; an hour is pretty
much the same to everyone everywhere. Furthermore, our measure of
welfare is an autonomy-based measure, reflecting people’s control over
the resource of time rather than (as with the spare time indicator) how
they actually use that resource. Discretionary time, as we shall call it,
measures temporal autonomy and the welfare associated with it.
Temporal autonomy is the freedom to spend one’s time as one pleases,
outside the necessities of everyday life. A person enjoys temporal
autonomy to the extent that he or she has time during which he or she
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is free to choose the activities in which he or she participates. That, of
course, is constrained by everyone’s need to spend some time in certain
necessary activities of everyday life. Everyone needs to spend some time
in personal care (eating and sleeping, for example) and most people need
to spend some time in paid labour and unpaid household labour as well.
Our measure of temporal autonomy, discretionary time, takes account of
people’s necessities in those three arenas of everyday life – paid labour,
unpaid household labour, and personal care.
A person’s discretionary time, as we define it, is the time during which
it is not necessary for that person to participate in paid labour, unpaid
household labour, or personal care. In other words, it is the time that
person has at his or her disposal, after taking into account the time he or
she strictly needs to spend in those three sorts of activities. Hence, we
define the number of hours of discretionary time per week as follows:
discretionary time =  – necessary paid labour time – necessary unpaid
household labour time – necessary personal care time.
This definition of discretionary time is morphologically very similar to
the definition of spare time mentioned earlier. Both focus on the time a
person has at his or her disposal, after taking into account time in paid
labour, unpaid household labour, and personal care. The difference is
that, whereas the measure of spare time focuses on the time a person
actually spends in these three activities, the definition of discretionary time
focuses on the time a person needs to spend in these activities. This is the
crucial difference that makes discretionary time a superior indicator of
welfare.
Consider a monetary analogy. Calling someone ‘ time-poor’ (Vickery
; Schor ; ) by virtue of the small amount of time he or she
has left over after all the time he or she actually spends in paid labour,
unpaid household labour, and personal care is rather like calling a
spendthrift millionaire ‘ money-poor’ by virtue of the small amount of
money she has left over after all the money she actually spends on highly
extravagant food, clothing, and shelter – dinner at exclusive restaurants,
designer outfits, multiple mansions, and such like. But surely that is
absurd. A better approach would be to assess the millionaire’s welfare on
the basis of the money she has at her disposal after taking into account
what she needs to spend on food, clothing, and shelter. As with money, so
too with time: a person’s welfare could be measured on the basis of the
time that person has at his or her disposal after taking into account the
time he or she actually spends in paid labour, unpaid household labour,
and personal care. But a better approach would be to measure a person’s
welfare on the basis of the time that person has at his or her disposal after
taking into account the time he or she needs to spend in these three
activities.
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The task of developing an empirical operationalisation of the theor-
etical definition of discretionary time just described will be taken up in
the following section. It is worth noting here, however, that necessary
time in paid labour, unpaid household labour, and personal care would
ordinarily be expected to be less than actual time in these three activities.
Of course, it is always possible for any given person to spend less time
than necessary in paid labour (thus having a below-poverty income), less
time than necessary in unpaid household labour (thus having a filthier
house than socially acceptable), or less time than necessary in personal
care (thus being less kempt than socially acceptable). But an operation-
alisation of necessity that identifies a majority of people as doing less paid
labour, unpaid household labour, or personal care than deemed
necessary – especially in relatively privileged societies like the USA,
Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden – would be a distinctly strange
notion of necessity.
Because necessary time is generally less than actual time in paid
labour, unpaid household labour, and personal care, our methodology
thus allows us to distinguish two components within actual time spent in
each of those activities: one component that is necessary, and another
component that is not necessary, but rather discretionary.
Operationalising the key variables: data sources and methods
Having described that notion of discretionary time from a theoretical
point of view, we now turn to the task of developing an empirical
operationalisation.
A. Data sets
In order to operationalise discretionary time in the five countries
under investigation, two multinational data sets have been used: the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the Multinational Time Use Study
(MTUS) (Gershuny ; LIS , ; MTUS , ). Both the
LIS and the MTUS collect together, harmonise, and standardise surveys
from a range of countries and time periods for the purpose of facilitating
comparative research. The purview of these two multinational data sets
is different, however: the LIS focuses on income surveys, the MTUS on
time use surveys.
The MTUS was the original source for all of the time use variables
used in the analysis presented in this paper. Spare time was calculated on
the basis of the MTUS alone. The MTUS was also the source of the basic
parameters used in the calculation of necessary time in unpaid household
 James Mahmud Rice, Robert E. Goodin and Antti Parpo
labour and necessary time in personal care. These parameters were then
used to calculate necessary time in unpaid household labour and personal
care for the observations contained in the LIS.
We used only those surveys in these two data sets that contained
sufficient information to be usable for our purposes, and which had a
usable near-contemporaneous counterpart in the other data set. This
limited our analysis to five countries, and to one period in each country,
as listed in Table .
B. Sample restrictions
Two separate samples were used at different points in our analysis.
Sample A consisted of all households. This sample was used in the
calculation of various figures relating to notions of necessity: the poverty
line; necessary time in unpaid household labour; and necessary time in
personal care. Sample B consisted of a more restricted set of households.
These were households that included either: () a husband and a wife who
were both of prime working age (that is, between  and  years of age),
who did not live with any other adults, and at least one of whom was an
T : Income and time use surveys
Time period to
which income and
time use data relate Sample sizea Sourceb
USA
Current Population Survey – March Supplement  , LIS
American Time Use Survey   , MTUS
AUSTRALIA
 Survey of Income and Housing Costs and
Amenities
 , LIS
Time Use Survey Australia   , MTUS
GERMANY
German Socio-Economic Panel  , LIS
/ Time Budget Survey of the Federal
Republic of Germany
/ , MTUS
FRANCE
Household Budget Survey   , LIS
Time Use Survey / , MTUS
SWEDEN
Income Distribution Survey  , LIS
Time Use Survey / / , MTUS
Notes: aSample B, respondents aged – years.
bLIS = Luxembourg Income Study, MTUS = Multinational Time Use Study.
Sources: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (, ) and Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS)
(, ).
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earner; or () a single man or woman who was of prime working age
(between  and  years of age), who did not live with any other adults,
and who was an earner. These households could either include children
or not include children. The discretionary time and spare time calcula-
tions reported in this paper are based on this sample, as are certain steps
in the calculation of necessary time in paid labour. Sample sizes for
Sample B are given in Table .
We restrict our focus in Sample B to prime working-aged people,
because one of our principal concerns is with people’s ability to achieve
a balance between work and family life, and how well different welfare
and gender regimes facilitate that. The people for whom that is primarily
an issue are those of prime working age, which is also prime child-rearing
age as well. Other restrictions in Sample B are introduced for methodo-
logical reasons. We restrict the sample to households with no adults apart
from the household head and the head’s spouse (if there was one), in
order to avoid complications surrounding how responsibilities for paid
labour and unpaid household labour might be shared in households with
more complex structures. Sample B also had to be restricted to house-
holds with at least one earner in order to facilitate the determination of
necessary time in paid labour.
C. Necessary time in paid labour
Everyone needs to access income, whether through paid labour, property
ownership, occupational pensions, government, private charitable or-
ganisations, relatives, or some other source. Exactly how much income
people need to access is a controversial issue. In this paper we adopt a
standard, if conservative, figure as the amount of income people need to
access – namely, the poverty line.
There are many ways of calculating a poverty line. The USA alone in
the OECD has an official poverty line defined in absolute monetary
terms. Elsewhere, particularly in Europe, when governments and es-
pecially public policy analysts talk about poverty, they define it relative to
the distribution of income within a society (Atkinson ).
We follow what is by now the most conventional way of defining the
poverty line, which is as  per cent of median equivalent income across
all people in a country (Atkinson , –). A person’s equivalent
income is calculated by dividing the household income of that person’s
household by an equivalence scale, for which we have used the square
root of the number of people in the household.
Following standard practice, when calculating the poverty line we
operationalise household income as post-government household income,
that is, household income net of the impact of government taxes and
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transfers. Thus, for example, we calculate the poverty line on the basis of
household income after taxes have been paid and after welfare benefits
have been received.
The impact of welfare and gender regimes is not confined to taxes and
transfers, however. Through the provision of subsidies for childcare,
welfare and gender regimes can affect the cost of childcare faced by
households. With this in mind, we make one further adjustment to
household income, estimating household income net of household child-
care costs. Since most of the surveys we used did not contain information
on household childcare costs, we were forced to impute them.
We did so through the following procedure. Firstly, we determined the
number of hours actually spent in paid labour, excluding travel to and
from work, by the adult in the household who actually spent the least
time in paid labour, once again excluding travel to and from work. We
then estimated household childcare costs for children under  years of
age by multiplying this number of hours in paid labour, excluding travel
to and from work, by the product of the number of children under  in
the household and the hourly cost to households of acquiring childcare
for a child under , after taking into account government subsidies.
Household childcare costs for children between  and  years of age were
estimated in a similar manner. Household childcare costs, lastly, were
estimated by adding together household childcare costs for these two age
groups of children. Household childcare costs were estimated to be zero
under certain circumstances: if there was no child in the household; if
there was an adult in the household who actually spent no time in paid
labour; or if the hourly cost to households of acquiring childcare, after
taking into account government subsidies, was zero. Figures for the
hourly cost of childcare, comparable across countries and time periods,
are hard to come by; we describe the procedure we used to estimate these
figures in a later section of this paper.
In order for a household to meet the poverty line, it needs a total
income equal to the poverty line multiplied by the equivalence scale,
which in our case is equal to the square root of the number of people in
the household.
One of the ways a household can acquire the income it needs is
through paid labour. However, that is not the only way. In order to meet
the poverty line, the amount of income a household needs to acquire
through paid labour specifically (or the household’s necessary paid labour
income) is equal to the amount of total income it needs, minus the
amount of income it would receive from alternative sources (property
ownership, occupational pensions, government taxes and transfers,
transfers from private charitable organisations, transfers from relatives,
child support, and alimony) if it was around the poverty line.
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A household’s income from property ownership and occupational
pensions is unlikely to change if its income were to move toward the
poverty line as a result of its income from other sources changing (as our
procedure for estimating necessary time in paid labour assumes). Con-
sequently, for our purposes the most appropriate estimate of the amount
of income a household would receive from property ownership and
occupational pensions is simply the amount that the household actually
receives from these sources.
The same is not necessarily true, however, for government taxes and
transfers, transfers from private charitable organisations, transfers from
relatives, child support, and alimony. The amount of income a household
receives from these sources might well change if its income were to move
toward the poverty line as a result of its income from other sources
changing. Consequently, for our purposes the most appropriate estimate
of the amount of income a household would receive from these sources
is not what the household actually receives, but rather what similar
households around the poverty line receive. We thus determined the
mean amounts of income from these sources that were received by
households that were both around the poverty line (that is, households
whose members had equivalent incomes between  and  per cent of
median equivalent income across all people) and similar to the house-
holds on which our subsequent analyses focus (that is, households that
were part of Sample B described earlier). These mean amounts of income
reflect a combination of, firstly, entitlement amounts and, secondly, mean
take-up rates.
For government taxes and transfers, transfers from private charitable
organisations, and transfers from relatives, we calculated separate means
for different groups of households, with the aim of capturing some of the
variation that exists in the allocation of income from these sources. We
first distinguished households with at least one child from those with no
child. Among households with at least one child, we then further
distinguished between single earners, two-earner couples, and one-earner
couples. Unfortunately, because of small numbers of observations it was
not possible to make these further distinctions among households with no
child. The figure used for the amount of income a household would
receive from these sources if it was around the poverty line was set to the
mean for whichever of these different groups the household belonged to.
For child support and alimony, we calculated separate means for two
different groups of households: those that received child support or
alimony; and those that did not (although for those that did not receive
child support or alimony, the mean was of course zero). It was not
possible to make any further distinctions, because of the small number
of observed households that received child support or alimony. The
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estimate used for the amount of income a household would receive from
these sources if it was around the poverty line was set to the mean for
households that received child support or alimony if the household
actually did receive child support or alimony. If the household actually
did not receive child support or alimony, this figure was set to the mean
for households that did not receive income from these sources (that is, it
was set to zero).
As mentioned earlier, the income a household would receive from
these alternative sources if it was around the poverty line is deducted
from the total income it needs in order to meet the poverty line, to yield
the household’s necessary paid labour income.
How much income each member of the household needs to acquire
through paid labour was determined in the following way. Firstly, though
children in the household might contribute to the household’s income,
they were assumed to have no responsibility for the household’s strictly
necessary paid labour income. Secondly, the proportional responsibility
that each adult in the household bears for the household’s necessary paid
labour income was set at the proportion that he or she contributes to the
total earnings (income from wages, salaries, and self employment)
actually received by all the household’s adults combined. Thus, how
much income each member of the household needs to acquire through
paid labour was equal to zero for children and, for adults, equal to the
household’s necessary paid labour income multiplied by the adult’s
actual earnings relative to the total actual earnings of all the adults in the
household.
The time a person needs to spend in paid labour, excluding travel to
and from work, was calculated by dividing the amount of income that
person needs to acquire through paid labour by that person’s wage rate
(that is, the person’s earnings divided by the hours he or she spends at
work).
The amount of income a person needs to acquire through paid labour
as just described is net of household childcare costs. If a household incurs
childcare costs in the course of meeting its income needs, adults in the
household will need to acquire more income through paid labour. When
calculating a person’s necessary time in paid labour, excluding travel to
and from work, we took into account the additional time a person needs
to spend in paid labour in order to meet his or her responsibilities in
relation to those further costs. Household childcare costs were estimated
as described earlier (except that these costs were indexed to the time
people need to spend in paid labour, excluding travel to and from work,
rather than the time people actually spent in paid labour, excluding
travel to and from work). A person’s proportional responsibility for
household childcare costs was calculated in the same way as a person’s
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proportional responsibility for his or her household’s necessary paid
labour income.
Finally, the time a person needs to spend in paid labour (a person’s
necessary time in paid labour) was calculated by taking the time that
person needs to spend in paid labour, excluding travel to and from work,
as just described, and adding to this the time that person needs to spend
in travel to and from work. The time a person needs to spend in travel
to and from work was calculated by first determining the number of days
that person needs to spend at work (given the time that person needs to
spend in paid labour, excluding travel to and from work, and assuming
that this time is concentrated into standard –hour work days) and then
multiplying this number of days by the mean time actually spent in travel
to and from work during work days.
D. Necessary time in unpaid household labour
The time a person needs to spend in unpaid household labour (a person’s
necessary time in unpaid household labour) is estimated in a manner
strongly analogous to the conventional way of calculating (via the poverty
line) the amount of income people need to access.
We first calculated the total amount of time actually spent in unpaid
household labour by all the people in a person’s household combined. In
order to take into account economies of scale in consumption and the
differing needs of households of different sizes, we divided this by an
equivalence scale, for which, as earlier, we used the square root of the
number of people in the household. In this way, we estimated a person’s
equivalent unpaid household labour time. We then calculated poverty
lines for unpaid household labour for each of four household types, with
each poverty line for unpaid household labour being defined as  per
cent of median equivalent unpaid household labour time across all of the
people within each household type.
These different household types reflect differing amounts of unpaid
household labour associated with childcare. Households with a child
under  years of age must do substantially more childcare (a component
of unpaid household labour) than households with no child or only older
children. Furthermore, how much time the adult or adults themselves
need to spend in childcare for a child under  depends on whether there
is a stay-at-home adult or whether all adults are employed. Thus we
calculate separate poverty lines for unpaid household labour for four
household types, first distinguishing households with at least one child
under  from those with no child under  and then further distinguishing
between households in which all adults are in paid labour from those in
which not all adults are in paid labour.
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The total amount of time all the people combined in a person’s
household need to spend in unpaid household labour (or the household’s
necessary time in unpaid household labour) is equal to the poverty line
for unpaid household labour for that person’s household type, multiplied
by the equivalence scale (the square root of the number of people in the
household).
A person’s necessary time in unpaid household labour was then
determined in the following way. Firstly, while children might help with
unpaid household labour, they were assumed to have no responsibility for
the household’s strictly necessary time in unpaid household labour.
Secondly, the proportional responsibility of each adult in the household
was taken to be equal to the proportion that he or she contributes to the
total amount of time actually spent in unpaid household labour by all the
adults in the household combined. Thus, a person’s necessary time in
unpaid household labour was equal to zero for children and, for adults,
equal to the household’s necessary time in unpaid household labour
multiplied by the adult’s actual time in unpaid household labour relative
to the total amount of time actually spent in unpaid household labour by
all the adults in the household combined.
E. Necessary time in personal care
The time a person needs to spend in personal care (a person’s necessary
time in personal care) is estimated in a manner similar to the conven-
tional way of calculating (via the poverty line) the amount of income
people need to access. More specifically, we assign each person a
necessary time in personal care equal to a given percentage of median
actual time in personal care across all people. In the case of personal care,
however, the percentage we use is  per cent rather than the  per cent
used in the case of paid labour and unpaid household labour. In theory,
we could use  per cent rather than  per cent when estimating
necessary time in personal care. However, doing so yields estimates that
are simply not plausible. In the five countries under investigation here,
median time in personal care is around  hours per week; taking  per
cent of this would yield estimates of necessary time in personal care of
around  hours per week, or around  hours per day. But surely people
require far more than that to sleep, eat, and undertake other personal
care activities. Using  per cent rather than  per cent yields estimates
of necessary time in personal care closer to  hours per week, or around
 hours per day.
In all these various ways, necessity in paid labour, unpaid household
labour, and personal care are interpreted in ways that are relative rather
than absolute. Necessity in each of these three arenas of everyday life is
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interpreted as what you need to do in order to meet minimal social
standards, as determined by what other people in your society do, rather
than what you need to do in order to meet bare, physical requirements.
F. The cost of childcare
Figures for the hourly cost of childcare are hard to come by. For each of
the five countries under investigation here, we estimated them through
the following procedure.
On the basis of information provided by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (, , ),
we calculated a figure for annual expenditure on early childhood
education per student in public and private institutions based on full-time
equivalents. We then divided this figure by the , hours per year that
constitute full-time childcare ( hours per week,  weeks per year). The
result was an estimate of hourly expenditure on early childhood
education per student in public and private institutions.
The resulting estimates relate to the cost of providing childcare. In the
absence of government subsidies for childcare, it is likely that these
estimates will approximate the hourly cost to households of acquiring
childcare in the private market.
Governments, however, typically do provide subsidies for childcare.
They do so to a degree that varies from country to country, however. In
Sweden – but not in any of the other countries under investigation
here – there was an entitlement or guaranteed access to publicly funded
early childhood education and care for children under  years of age. In
Germany, France, and Sweden – but not in the USA or Australia – there
were equivalent entitlements or guaranteed access for children between
 and  years of age. Even if there were no such entitlements or
guaranteed access, some children were nevertheless enrolled in publicly
funded early childhood education and care, with the extent of this
enrollment varying from one country to another (Gornick, Meyers and
Ross ; Gornick and Meyers ).
In order to estimate the hourly cost to households of acquiring
childcare for a child under  years of age, after taking into account
government subsidies, we adopted the following strategy. We first
estimated the likelihood that a household that would like to enrol a child
of this age in publicly subsidised childcare would actually be able to
do so. If there was an entitlement or guaranteed access to publicly
funded early childhood education and care for children under , we
assumed that this likelihood was  per cent. If there was no such
entitlement or guaranteed access, we estimated this likelihood by dividing
the percentage of children under  enrolled in publicly funded early
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childhood education and care by the percentage of children under 
living in households in which all the adults were either employed or
studying (and which, as a result, had the greatest need for childcare).
We then estimated the likelihood that a household that would like to
enrol a child under  in publicly subsidised childcare would actually not
be able to do so, which, of course, is equal to  minus the likelihood just
discussed.
With these likelihoods in hand, we took the hourly cost to households
of acquiring childcare for a child under , after taking into account
government subsidies, as being equal to its expected value, given these
likelihoods and given the hourly cost to households of acquiring childcare
in the private market, in the absence of government subsidies, and the
hourly cost to households of acquiring publicly subsidised childcare. The
hourly cost to households of acquiring childcare in the private market has
already been discussed. We assumed that the hourly cost to households
of acquiring publicly subsidised childcare was negligible. We adopted a
similar strategy in order to estimate the hourly cost to households of
acquiring childcare for a child between  and  years of age, after taking
into account government subsidies.
For both of these age groups of children, information on entitlements
and guaranteed access to publicly funded early childhood education and
care and on percentages of children enrolled in publicly funded early
childhood education and care was derived from Gornick, Meyers, and
Ross () and Gornick and Meyers (). Information on percentages
of children living in households in which all the adults were either
employed or studying was derived from the LIS.
G. Pre-government and post-government discretionary time
As mentioned earlier, discretionary time is calculated by subtracting
necessary time in paid labour, unpaid household labour, and personal
care from . Up to this point, necessary time in these activities – and
hence discretionary time – have been described in a way that takes into
account the activities of welfare-gender regimes. That is to say, up to this
point we have been dealing with post-government discretionary time. Since
the focus of this paper is on the impact that welfare-gender regimes have
on the temporal autonomy of their citizens, we need to imagine what
necessary time in paid labour, unpaid household labour, and personal
care – and hence discretionary time – would be in the absence of the
activities of welfare-gender regimes. That is to say, we need to estimate
pre-government discretionary time. Pre-government discretionary time,
then, is the amount of discretionary time a person would have at his or
her disposal in the absence of such items as government taxes, transfers,
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and childcare subsidies; post-government discretionary time, in contrast,
is the amount of time the person has at his or her disposal net of
those. The difference between post-government and pre-government
discretionary time can then be taken as an indicator of the impact
that welfare-gender regimes have on the temporal autonomy of their
citizens.
Pre-government discretionary time was estimated in the same manner
as post-government discretionary time, except that the following three
adjustments were put into effect.
Firstly, the amount of income a household would receive from
government taxes and transfers if it was around the poverty line was set
to zero.
Secondly, our estimates of the hourly cost to households of acquiring
childcare in the private market, in the absence of government subsidies,
were used in place of our estimates of the hourly cost to households of
acquiring childcare, after taking into account government subsidies.
Thirdly, for German and French households in which the age of the
youngest child was between  and  years and at least one adult was not
employed, the household’s necessary time in unpaid household labour
was increased. This is because, in Germany and France, children
between  and  years or age were quite likely to be enrolled in publicly
subsidised childcare, even if they lived in households in which at least one
adult was not employed. In contrast, children between  and  were quite
unlikely to be enrolled in publicly subsidised childcare in the USA,
Australia, and Sweden if they lived in households in which at least one
adult was not employed. The same was true for children under  years of
age in all of the countries under investigation here. A child who lived in
a household in which at least one adult was not employed and who was
enrolled in publicly subsidised childcare would no longer be so enrolled
in the absence of the activities of welfare-gender regimes. In this
situation, the stay-at-home adult would presumably take on the childcare
responsibilities that were shouldered by publicly subsidised childcare. In
this way, the household’s necessary time in unpaid household labour
would increase.
The extent of this increase was calculated on the basis of estimates –
derived from Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (), Gornick and Meyers
(), and the LIS – of the number and age of children in the household,
the mean hours of publicly subsidised childcare provided per week, and
the likelihood that children of different age groups would be enrolled in
publicly subsidised childcare if they lived in households in which at least
one adult was not employed. According to our estimates, this latter
likelihood was negligible except in the case of children between  and 
years of age in Germany and France, as alluded to earlier.
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Discretionary time and spare time: overall patterns
We will now, in this section and the next, describe the basic patterns that
emerge from the distributions of discretionary time and spare time within
the five countries under study. Table  presents, for these five countries,
overall means for spare time and discretionary time among prime
working-aged adults in households with at least one earner. Pre-
government discretionary time is the amount of discretionary time these
adults would have had in the absence of government taxes, transfers, and
childcare subsidies; post-government discretionary time is the amount of
time they have net of those. Table  lists means for both of those and the
differences between them for each country. The table also includes
standard deviations, as indicators of dispersion.
Looking first at mean spare time, prime working-aged adults in
Australia, France, and Sweden have the least spare time, while those in
Germany have the most. Adults in the USA enjoy a middling amount of
spare time.
A notably different crossnational ranking emerges when we look
instead at discretionary time. Both mean pre-government and mean
post-government discretionary time are lowest in France and highest in
Sweden. The differences are considerable. In Sweden prime working-
aged adults enjoy . hours per week more discretionary time than their
counterparts in France pre-government, rising to . hours per week
more post-government.
The impact of welfare-gender regimes, specifically, on the temporal
autonomy of their citizens is measured by the difference between
T : Overall mean spare time and mean discretionary time
Spare time
(hours per week)
Discretionary time (hours per week)
Pre-gov’t Post-gov’t Difference
USA, – . . .  .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Australia, – . . .  .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Germany, – . . .  .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
France, – . . .  .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Sweden, – . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Sources: MTUS: Sample B, respondents aged – years (spare time); LIS and
MTUS: Sample B, respondents aged – years (discretionary time).
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post-government and pre-government discretionary time. In the USA,
Australia, Germany, and France, the effect of welfare-gender regimes is
on average to decrease the discretionary time that adults have at their
disposal – considerably in Germany, marginally in Australia. The
Swedish welfare-gender regime, alone among those represented in this
study, actually increases the discretionary time that adults have at their
disposal.
These countrywide means, however, only tell part of the story here.
Within each of these countries, there is noteworthy dispersion around
each mean. Within each country, certain groups will find themselves
above the mean, while others will find themselves below; certainly the
standard deviations presented in Table  are notable in size relative to the
means. We will now explore the incidence and distribution of discretion-
ary time and spare time in different household types within each of these
countries, which is the source of much of this overall within-country
dispersion.
Discretionary time and spare time in diﬀerent household types
Means for spare time and pre-government and post-government
discretionary time among prime working-aged men and women in
different types of households with at least one earner are given in
Appendix Table A. That table also lists the differences between the
means for post-government and pre-government discretionary time
among these men and women. The table also includes standard
deviations, as indicators of dispersion. These figures are presented for
eight groups of men and women identified on the basis of various
household characteristics: whether or not the household has at least one
child; whether the household is constituted by a single earner, a
two-earner couple, or a one-earner couple; and in one-earner couples,
whether the man or woman is an earner or a non-earner.
Focusing on the means for spare time and post-government discretion-
ary time, some crossnationally consistent patterns clearly emerge across
our five countries. One is that, in all of these countries, the same
particular groups of men and women occupy the extreme ends of the
distributions of spare time and post-government discretionary time. More
specifically the following patterns can be identified.
Firstly, in all of these countries mothers in two-earner couples have
very small amounts of spare time. Secondly, in all of these countries
non-employed men in childless, one-earner couples have the most spare
time. Non-employed women in childless, one-earner couples and non-
employed fathers in one-earner couples have the next most spare time.
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Thirdly, single mothers consistently have very low levels of post-
government discretionary time. The same is true of employed mothers in
one-earner couples. Fourthly, non-employed men in childless, one-earner
couples consistently enjoy the most post-government discretionary time.
Men in childless, two-earner couples and non-employed fathers in
one-earner couples also consistently enjoy very high levels of post-
government discretionary time.
The following more general patterns can also be delineated.
Firstly, non-employed men and women in one-earner couples almost
invariably have more spare time than their employed counterparts both
in one-earner couples and in the other household types. The same is
true in relation to post-government discretionary time. For example,
non-employed mothers in one-earner couples almost invariably have
relatively large amounts of both spare time and post-government
discretionary time in comparison to employed mothers in one-earner and
two-earner couples, as well as in comparison to single mothers. Secondly,
men and women in households with at least one child almost invariably
have less spare time than their counterparts in households with no
child. The same is true in relation to post-government discretionary
time. Thirdly, men and women in two-earner couples consistently
have more post-government discretionary time than their employed
counterparts in the other household types. Fourthly, males almost
invariably have more post-government discretionary time than their
female counterparts.
On the whole, the groups of men and women with comparatively small
amounts of spare time are not necessarily the same as those with
relatively low levels of post-government discretionary time. Similarly, the
groups of men and women with comparatively high levels of post-
government discretionary time are not necessarily the same as those with
relatively large amounts of spare time. This counts as crossnational
confirmation of a pattern we found in earlier research on Australia alone
(Goodin, Rice, Bittman and Saunders ).
The impact of welfare and gender regimes on diﬀerent household types
The previous two sections have described the basic patterns that emerge
from the distributions of discretionary time and spare time within the five
countries under study here. In this and the following section, we turn
specifically to the impact the various welfare-gender regimes have on the
discretionary time of particular groups within these countries. Taking the
difference between post-government and pre-government discretionary
time as an indicator of the impact that welfare-gender regimes have on
the temporal autonomy of their citizens, what does Appendix Table A
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suggest about each of the countries under study here and their respective
regimes?
The welfare-gender regime in the USA appears to be a regime that has
marginal or negative effects on the temporal autonomy of its citizens –
with the exception, that is, of highly targeted, positive effects on single
parents. The actions of the welfare-gender regime in the USA work to
increase the discretionary time at the disposal of single mothers by .
hours per week. This can be interpreted as indicating that, in the absence
of the activities of the welfare-gender regime in the USA, single mothers
would on average need to spend an extra . hours per week in paid
labour in order to raise their families to the poverty line. The welfare-
gender regime in the USA also increases the discretionary time enjoyed
by single fathers, by . hours per week.
The welfare-gender regime in Australia echoes that in the USA. The
Australian welfare-gender regime, like its counterpart in the USA, has
highly targeted, positive effects on the temporal autonomy of single
parents. The Australian welfare-gender regime works to increase the
discretionary time at the disposal of single mothers by . hours per
week, while the discretionary time enjoyed by single fathers is also
increased, by . hours per week.
The welfare-gender regime in Germany could be characterised as
temporally natalist and supportive of families – but only in a way that is
highly selective. In Germany, men and women in one-earner couples face
smaller government-imposed penalties in terms of temporal autonomy if
they have a child than if they do not. This contrasts with the situation
confronted by men and women who are single or in two-earner couples,
who either face larger government-imposed temporal penalties if they
have a child, or else face more or less the same temporal penalties.
Notably, the German welfare-gender regime increases the discretionary
time experienced by non-earners in one-earner couples with at least one
child, while having little effect on the discretionary time of non-earners in
one-earner couples with no child. Through its impact on the discretion-
ary time experienced by different groups of men and women, the
German welfare-gender regime encourages men and women in one-
earner couples to have children, while at the same time discouraging
those in two-earner couples from doing so and providing little encour-
agement to men and women who are single. The German welfare-gender
regime also encourages the formation of couples, reserving its largest
penalties in terms of temporal autonomy for single men and women,
whether with or without a child (it decreases the discretionary time single
men and women have at their disposal by between . and . hours
per week).
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Like the welfare-gender regime in Germany, the French welfare-
gender regime emerges as one that is characterised temporally by natalist
tendencies and the provision of significant levels of support for families.
While the French welfare-gender regime is particularly supportive of
families with only one earner, it is nevertheless temporally natalist and
supportive of families in a much broader and more powerful way than is
the German regime. Without exception, fathers and mothers in France
experience more positive impacts on their temporal autonomy as a result
of the actions of the French welfare-gender regime than do their
counterparts in households with no child. These differences are particu-
larly pronounced for those in households with only one earner, that is,
single earners and those in one-earner couples. For example, whereas the
actions of the French welfare-gender regime increase the discretionary
time at the disposal of single mothers by . hours per week, they
decrease the discretionary time experienced by single women with no
child by . hours per week. Similarly, while the French welfare-gender
regime increases the discretionary time of earners in one-earner couples
with at least one child by between . and . hours per week, it
decreases the discretionary time of earners in one-earner couples with no
child by between . and . hours per week. Notably, the French
welfare-gender regime – like its German counterpart – increases the
discretionary time experienced by non-earners in one-earner couples
with at least one child, while having little impact on the discretionary
time experienced by non-earners in one-earner couples with no child.
The differences between fathers and mothers and men and women in
households with no child are more subdued for those in two-earner
couples, although they still operate in favour of fathers and mothers.
The Swedish welfare-gender regime is characterised temporally by
powerful natalist tendencies and the provision of significant levels of
support for families. The welfare-gender regime in Sweden generally
impacts positively on the temporal autonomy of men and women with at
least one child, but negatively on those with no child. The sole exception
to this pattern is that the Swedish welfare-gender regime has little effect
on the discretionary time experienced by non-earners in one-earner
couples, irrespective of whether they have a child or not.
The impact of welfare and gender regimes on groups of regime-speciﬁc concern
As discussed earlier, different welfare-gender regimes take particular
interest in the welfare of different groups within society. To assess
welfare-gender regimes’ differential impact on those of most concern to
them, we need to conduct a group-by-group assessment of their impact
on temporal autonomy.
The Temporal Welfare State 
Liberal welfare-gender regimes, recall, would traditionally be expected
to concentrate their largesse first and foremost on the ‘ deserving poor’
(the old, the young, and the disabled) and, secondly, on the poor. Other
welfare-gender regimes with more pro-natalist orientations might con-
sider motherhood, even single motherhood, a deserving status in its own
right. Earlier liberal welfare regimes might have done likewise; witness
US Aid to Families with Dependent Children and the Australian Sole
Parent Pension (still extant during the time period here under discussion:
Barrett ). But even after ceasing to count single mothers among the
‘ deserving poor’, liberal welfare-gender regimes would still be expected
to concentrate benefits on single mothers and their children as the
‘ poorest of the poor’. For that reason if no other, we ought to expect that,
while some (but not other) welfare-gender regimes ought be expected to
assist single mothers, liberal regimes ought be expected to help them and
largely them alone.
Figure  offers evidence on that point. This figure describes the impact
of welfare-gender regimes on the discretionary time of prime working-
aged single, working mothers. Here the impact of welfare-gender regimes
is measured by the difference between post-government and pre-
government discretionary time. From this figure we see that the liberal
welfare-gender regimes in the USA and Australia do indeed have
significant positive impacts on the discretionary time of single mothers (as
foreshadowed in the previous section of this paper). Both regimes give
single mothers more than  extra hours a week, about the same as the
regime in Sweden and notably more than the regimes in the other
countries. That performance ought be set in context, of course: single
mothers in the USA and Australia had less discretionary time, pre-
government, than single mothers in any of the other countries (see
Appendix Table A). Even after the relatively strong performance in
assisting single mothers provided by the welfare-gender regimes in the
USA and Australia, single mothers in the USA still end up with notably
less discretionary time, post-government, than their counterparts in all
the other countries, while single mothers in Australia end up with less
post-government discretionary time than their counterparts in all the
other countries bar Germany. Still, if we are judging welfare-gender
regimes by the priorities they set, the liberal regimes in the USA and
Australia run true to the expectations previously outlined.
Corporatist welfare-gender regimes, as conservative regimes, would be
expected to be particularly concerned to promote traditional family
structures, leading them to take a particular interest in stay-at-home
mothers. An inspection of Appendix Table A shows that of the
welfare-gender regimes studied here the corporatist regimes in Germany
and France are indeed the only ones to have any impact at all on the
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amount of discretionary time enjoyed by prime working-aged stay-at-
home mothers in one-earner couples. Of the two, the regime in France
makes the most difference in absolute terms (. hours per week). The
contribution to stay-at-home mothers’ discretionary time made by the
regime in Germany is less in absolute terms (. hours per week); but it
should be noted that the German regime treats them better than virtually
any other group, virtually all of the others being net losers in
discretionary-time terms from German regime interventions. Once
again, stay-at-home mothers have more discretionary time, in absolute
terms, in other countries (particularly, the USA and Sweden) than they
do in Germany and France. But in terms of the difference government
taxes, transfers, and childcare subsidies make, those of the corporatist
welfare-gender regimes make the greatest positive differences to the
discretionary time of stay-at-home mothers, just as would ordinarily be
expected.
Finally, social democratic welfare-gender regimes would traditionally
be expected to combine a concern with pro-natalism with a concern for
gender equality. The first of these concerns would be expected to lead
them to promote the interests of parents over those of non-parents. The
second would be expected to lead them to focus most particularly upon
the equal participation of men and women in the paid labour market,
F : The impact of welfare and gender regimes on the discretionary time of
single, working mothers
Sources: LIS and MTUS: Sample B, women aged – years with at least
one child who are single and earners.
The Temporal Welfare State 
even (or perhaps especially) if they have children. The combination of
these two considerations leads us to expect social democratic welfare-
gender regimes to be particularly supportive of two-earner couples with
children.
That expectation is borne out by evidence from Appendix Table A.
There we see that in Sweden all categories of parents who are in paid
labour are net gainers in discretionary-time terms post-government
compared to pre-government (as alluded to in the previous section of this
paper). Among the countries under study, Sweden is unique in that
respect. In all the other countries, many (in some countries, most)
categories of parents in paid labour are net losers in discretionary time
terms from welfare-gender regime interventions. The closest that any
other country comes to achieving the same record as Sweden is France,
where all categories of parents in paid labour are net gainers, except
those in two-earner couples. The case of parents in two-earner couples is
the litmus test that distinguishes the pro-natalism of France’s corporatist
regime from the gendered-egalitarian pro-natalism of Sweden’s strongly
social democratic one.
Figure  offers evidence on that score. This figure describes the impact
of welfare-gender regimes on the discretionary time of prime working-
aged parents in two-earner couples. The impact of welfare-gender
regimes is measured by the difference between post-government and
pre-government discretionary time. From Figure  we see that the social
democratic welfare-gender regime in Sweden is the only regime that has
a positive impact on the discretionary time available to parents in
two-earner couples. There we also see that the magnitude of the Swedish
regime’s impact on the discretionary time of the household as a whole
(adding together the impacts on the father and the mother) is broadly on
a par with the positive impacts other regimes have on their favoured
groups; and, recalling Figure , this is also broadly on a par with the
impact the Swedish regime has on single mothers.
Conclusion
The familiar welfare and gender regimes can indeed be replicated
looking at time rather than money. The great advantage of doing so is to
help us see, in ways that are meaningful to one and all, just how big the
differences between those regimes actually are. If I hear that the
government gave someone $,, it is hard to immediately know what
to make of that information. Is it a lot? Is it a little? If I hear that,
thanks to the government, someone has an extra  hours a week to
spend as he or she pleases, that is information to which I can relate: I
know what  hours is and what could be done with it. Time is a
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metric that is interpersonally comparable as well as personally deeply
meaningful.
Moving from France to Sweden, you would gain around  extra hours
of discretionary time per week – time to spend as you please. Think of it
as having Monday off work each week. That constitutes a substantial
difference in temporal autonomy.
The specific tax-transfer and childcare arrangements of different
welfare and gender regimes make much less of a difference. On average,
those arrangements give people nearly an hour extra a week of
discretionary time in social democratic Sweden, whereas they actually
reduce discretionary time on average in all the other regime types and by
as much as  hours a week in Germany.
But countrywide averages tell only part of the story here. Each welfare
and gender regime prioritises certain groups over others; and those who
are singled out for special treatment in this way tend to get around 
hours a week more discretionary time from that regime’s tax-transfer and
childcare system. Stay-at-home mothers are favoured in this way in
corporatist France (and to a lesser extent in Germany). Parents in
two-earner couples, adding together the increases in discretionary time
for both partners, are favoured to about the same extent in social
democratic Sweden. Lone mothers are favoured to about the same extent
in all countries (except in corporatist Germany); but lone mothers benefit
F : The impact of welfare and gender regimes on the discretionary time of
parents in two-earner couples
Sources: LIS and MTUS: Sample B, respondents aged – years who are
in two-earner couples with at least one child.
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most from the highly targeted, liberal welfare and gender regimes in the
USA and Australia, and from social democratic Sweden’s strongly
pro-natalist, gendered-egalitarian one.
All the welfare and gender regimes thus run true to form, favouring in
temporal terms precisely the groups that we have always thought they
favoured in their tax-transfer and childcare provisions. Together, the
impact of those arrangements is to increase the discretionary time
available to the groups favoured by each regime by about  hours a week.
Having a half day more a week is a not inconsiderable contribution to
one’s temporal autonomy. Thinking of the impact of government
interventions in these sorts of temporal terms helps us see, in a
particularly vivid way, just what they are worth to us in our daily lives.
A T A: Mean spare time and mean discretionary time in diﬀerent
household types
One-earner couples
Single earners Two-earner couples Earners Non-earners
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Households with no child (hours per week)
USA, –
Spare time . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Difference  .  .  .  .  .  . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
AUSTRALIA, –
Spare time . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference  .  .  .  .  .  .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
GERMANY, –
Spare time . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (. (.)a (.)a (.)
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A T A: Continued
One-earner couples
Single earners Two-earner couples Earners Non-earners
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
GERMANY, –
Discretionary time
Post-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference  .  .  .  .  .  .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
FRANCE, –
Spare time . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Difference  .  .  .  .  .  . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
SWEDEN, –
Spare time . . . . . . .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference  .  .  .  .  .  .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Households with at least one child (hours per week)
USA, –
Spare time . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Difference . .  .  .  .  . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
AUSTRALIA, –
Spare time .a . . . . .a .a .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
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A T A: Continued
One-earner couples
Single earners Two-earner couples Earners Non-earners
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
AUSTRALIA, –
Discretionary time
Post-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference . .  .  .  .  .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
GERMANY, –
Spare time . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t .a . . . . .a .a .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Post-gov’t .a . . . . .a .a .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference  .a  .  .  .  .  .a .a .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
FRANCE, –
Spare time .a . . . . . . .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t .a . . . . . . .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Post-gov’t .a . . . . . . .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Difference .a .  .  . . . . .
(.)a (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
SWEDEN, –
Spare time . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Discretionary time
Pre-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Post-gov’t . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Difference . . . . . .a .a .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)a (.)a (.)
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
aThe number of observations in this cell is less than .
Sources: MTUS: Sample B, respondents aged – years (spare time); LIS and MTUS: Sample B,
respondents aged – years (discretionary time).
 James Mahmud Rice, Robert E. Goodin and Antti Parpo
NOTES
. Precursors are found in Goodin, Parpo and Kangas () and Goodin, Rice, Bittman and
Saunders (): we stand by the rationales offered there, although over the course of this evolving
project some of the finer points of methodology have been altered.
. How well this distinction corresponds to that mentioned earlier (between one component that is an
instance of spare time or leisure and another that is not) would be an interesting question for future
research.
. There are theoretical grounds for supposing that one’s wage rate might be a function of the time
one spends in paid labour, excluding travel to and from work. We explored this possibility by first
estimating an equation that treated a person’s wage rate as a function of the time that person spent
in paid labour, excluding travel to and from work, in addition to various human capital and other
characteristics, and then incorporating this equation into the determination of the time a person
needs to spend in paid labour, again excluding travel to and from work. This did not change our
basic results very much, so we omitted these complications from our further analyses.
. Households with a child under  in which all adults are employed will meet some of those needs
by purchasing childcare; and the time adults in such households themselves need to spend in unpaid
household labour will be reduced accordingly (although the time they need to spend in paid labour
to pay for this extra childcare will increase accordingly, as reflected in our calculations of necessary
time in paid labour). In households in which at least one adult is not employed, all the extra unpaid
household labour associated with the care of a child under  would be performed in-house by the
stay-at-home adult.
. When necessary time in personal care is estimated in this much more plausible manner, across the
five countries under study here the percentage of people who spend less time than necessary in
personal care ranges between a minimum of . per cent (in Sweden) and a maximum of . per
cent (in the USA). These percentages line up well against more conventional poverty rates based
on income, that is, the percentages of people who access less income than necessary as defined by
the poverty line. Across the countries under study here, the poverty rate ranged between a
minimum of . per cent (again in Sweden) and a maximum of . per cent (once again, in the
USA) .
. Reassuringly, this does indeed seem to be the case. In the case of Australia, for example, Teal ()
argues that in  the mean hourly amount paid by parents who used private long day care centres
was $. per child. Our estimate of the hourly cost to Australian households of acquiring childcare
in the private market, in the absence of government subsidies, approximates this other estimate very
nicely, at $. per child.
. Once again, reassuringly, our estimates seem to approximate other estimates. In the case of
Australia, for example, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare () suggests that, in
relation to two-earner couples on . average weekly earnings with one child in long day care in
, the mean hourly cost of childcare borne by parents (which equals the fee charged by childcare
providers minus the cost of childcare borne by government, that is, the amount of government
assistance payable) ranged between $. and $., depending on the type of long day care used
(in community-based centres, in private centres, or family day care) and the amount of time long
day care was used for ( or  hours per week). Our estimates of the hourly cost to Australian
households of acquiring childcare, after taking into account government subsidies, are, at $. per
child under  and $. per child between  and , consistent with these other estimates.
. For a child who lived in a household in which all the adults were employed and who was enrolled
in publicly subsidised childcare, the childcare responsibilities shouldered by publicly subsidised
childcare would, in the absence of the activities of welfare-gender regimes, presumably be taken on
by childcare in the private market. This is taken into account via the second adjustment listed here.
. Except in France, where employed women in childless, one-earner couples have less spare time
than the latter group, but marginally more spare time than the former group.
. With the exception of non-employed women in childless, one-earner couples in France and
non-employed women in one-earner couples with at least one child in Australia.
. With the exception of non-employed women in childless, one-earner couples in Germany and
Sweden and non-employed women in one-earner couples with at least one child in Sweden.
. With the exception of employed men in one-earner couples in France.
. With the exception of employed men and women in one-earner couples in Sweden.
. With the exception of single men and women with no child and employed men and women in
childless, one-earner couples in Sweden.
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. The only exceptions are non-earners in childless, one-earner couples (on whom the German
interventions have no impact either way) and non-employed fathers in one-earner couples (for
whom the impact is positive and of the same order of magnitude as that for stay-at-home mothers
in one-earner couples, although the figure for fathers is based on observations too few in number
to be entirely reliable).
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